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THE PROSECUTOR v. DUSKO TADIC: AN APPRAISAL 





Michael P. Scharf 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, four times as many civilians have 
been victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity than were 
soldiers killed in all the international wars combined.1 After the 
Nazis exterminated 6 million Jews during the Holocaust, the world 
community proclaimed "never again." The victorious Allied powers 
set up an international tribunal at Nuremberg to prosecute the Nazi 
leaders for their monstrous deeds. There was hope that the legacy 
of Nuremberg would lead to the institutionalization of a judicial 
response to atrocities wherever and by whomever committed across 
the globe. 
Yet, the pledge of "never again" quickly became the reality of 
"again and again" as the world community failed to take action to 
bring those responsible to justice when 4 million people were 
murdered during Stalin's purges (1937-1953), 5 million were 
annihilated during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 2 
million were butchered in Cambodia's killing fields (1975-1979), 
30,000 disappeared during Argentina's Dirty War (1976-1983), 
200,000 were massacred in East Timor (1975-1985), 750,000 were 
exterminated in Uganda (1971-1987), 100,000 Kurds were gassed in 
Iraq (1987-1988), and 75,000 peasants were slaughtered by death 
• Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, 
New England School of Law; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department 
of State, 1989-1993; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1988; A.B., Duke University, 1985. 
During the trial of Dusko Tadic, Professor Scharf appeared as a frequent guest commentator 
on Court TV. Portions of this text also appear in MICHAEL P . SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE 
STORY BEHIND THE FIRsT INTERNATIONAL WAR CRlMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG (1997). 
1 Professor Rudi Rummel documents that as many as 170 million persons have been 
murdered by their own governments. See RUDOLPH J . RUMMEL, DEATH BY GoVERNMENT 9 
(1994). 
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squads in El Salvador (1980-1992).2 The United Nations (U.N.) 
High Commissioner for Human Rights summed up this state of 
affairs when he recently observed that "a person stands a better 
chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being than 
for killing 100,000."3 
In the summer of 1992, the world learned of the existence of Serb­
run concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where conditions 
were reminiscent of the Nazi-run camps of World War 11.4 Soon, 
daily reports of acts of unspeakable barbarity committed in the 
Balkans began to fill the pages of our newspapers.5 The city of 
Sarajevo, which had recently impressed the world as host ofthe 1984 
Winter Olympics, was transformed from a symbol of ethnic harmony 
into a bloody killing ground. For the first time since World War II, 
genocide had returned to Europe. The international outcry was 
deafening. 
Against great odds, the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal was 
established on May 25, 1993.6 Within a year and a half, the judges 
had been elected, a prosecutor and his staff appointed, a courtroom 
and detention center erected, rules of procedure promulgated, and 
the first indictments issued. 7 Among the first to be charged by the 
2 See Arlene Levinson, World Wipes Bloody Hands as Century Nears End; Advance of 
Civilization Has Brought with it Decline in the Value ofSanctity ofLife, PEORIA J . STAR, Sept. 
17, 1995, at AI. 
3 Quote of the Month , 8 BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 1 (May 14, 1996) (quoting Jose Anala Lassa). 
4 See, e.g., John F. Burns, Horrors in Bosnia Recall Nazi Atrocities; Killings, Rapes, Abuse 
Prompt Comparisons, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal. ), June 21, 1992, at Al (reporting on the 
horrific conditions of the concentration camps in Bosnia); Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serbia's 
War: Tales ofHunger, Torture at Camp in North Bosnia, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 19, 1992, at 7 
(same); Dave Todd, Serbian Concentration Camps Reported in Bosnia: Muslims, Croats Face 
Expulsion at Gunpoint, VANCOUVER SUN (Can.), July 31,1992, at A8 (same). 
6 See, e.g. , Louise Branson, Yugoslav Atrocities Take on Sinister Name, S.F . EXAMINER, J uly 
30, 1992, a t Al (describing the realities of the term "ethnic c\eansing"); Roy Gutman, Eyewit­
ness: Tales of Torture in Serb "Concentration Camps," The Serbs Call Them Prisoners of War 
But Inmates Tell ofRoutine Torture in the Army's "Concentration Camps," GUARDIAN (London), 
July 20, 1992, at 1 (reporting on conditions at a Manjaca "prisoner of war" camp); Dave Todd , 
The Human Toll ofBosnia's War Refugees, Orphans and Now Reports ofConcentration Camps , 
MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 31, 1992, at Al (reporting on Serbian "ethnic dear,sing" actions); 
Hundreds Reported Killed in Two Serbian Camps, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at All 
(reporting on the conditions at concentration camps in Bosnia). 
6 See United Nations Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia , S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. , 
3217th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. SIRESl827 (1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 8271. 
7 See generally 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, .AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995) (discussing the 
863 1997] Trial of Dusko Tadic 
Tribunal was Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb pub owner, karate 
instructor, and part-time traffic COp.8 Tadic had recently moved to 
Germany, where he was taken into custody after being identified as 
the "Butcher of Omarska" by Bosnian refugees who had been 
interned in the infamous Serb-run Omarska concentration camp.9 
Tadic was charged with thirty-four counts of crimes against 
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including 
the murder, rape and torture of Muslim men and women within and 
outside the Omarska camp. lO Tadic's trial, the first before the new 
international war crimes tribunal, began on May 7, 1996. 11 Over 
120 witnesses testified during the seven-month trial, which ended 
with closing arguments beginning on November 25. 12 As of the 
time of this writing, the Tribunal had not yet rendered a judgment 
in the case. 
II. An Assessment of the Tadic Trial 
Whether Tadic is acquitted, convicted, or, as is more likely to be 
the case, found guilty of only some charges, historians are apt to 
rank his trial among the most important of the century. 13 Unlike 
other renowned trials, such as the treason trials ofEthel and Julius 
Rosenberg, the Chicago Seven trial, the Watergate trials, the Rodney 
King case, and the O.J. Simpson trial, the importance of the Tadic 
case lies not in the status of the defendant nor the nature of his 
alleged crimes, but in the fact that the proceedings constituted an 
establishment of the Tribunal, the selection of its judges and prosecutor, and the interpretation 
of its statute and rules of procedure and evidence). 
8 See Jenifer Chao, Eyewitness Claims Serb Defendant Slit Muslim Cops' Throats, 
AsSOCIATED PRESS, J une 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4427694; Kit R. Roane, Family Says 
Hague War Crimes Tribunal Has the Wrong Person, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 12, 1996, 
at A4. 
9 See Germany Arrests Bosnian Serb for Alleged War Atrocities, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 
1994, at 7; UNITED PREss INT'L, Feb. 14, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws 
File. 
10 See Indictment, Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Case No. IT-94-1-T (Int'I Crim. 
Tribunal Feb. 13, 1995) (visited J an. 19, 1997) <http://www.courttv.com/casefileslwarcrimesl 
documen tslborov. html>. 
11 See Nicolas Miletitch, First War Crimes Trial Opens in The Hague, AGENCE FRANCE­
PRESSE, May 7, 1996, available in Lexis, News Library, Curnws File; Marlise Simons, Far 
From Former Yugoslavia, First War Crimes Trial Opens, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at AI. 
12 See Bosnian Mediator Unhurt After Women Mob Car in Sarajevo, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
27, 1996, at A12 (discussing the conclusion of the Tadic trial). 
13 See William W. Horne, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAw., Sept . 1995, at 5-6 
(discussing the impact the Tadic trial may have within the international arena). 
, 
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historic turning point for the world community.14 Just as the 
Nuremberg trials launched the era of promulgation of international 
human rights standards fifty years ago, the Tadic trial has 
inaugurated a new age of human rights enforcement. As the 
Yugoslav Tribunal itself reflected in its first annual report: 
The United Nations, which over the years has accumulated 
an impressive corpus of international standards enjoining 
States and individuals to conduct themselves humanely, has 
now set up an institution to put those standards to the test, 
to transform them into living reality. A whole body of lofty, 
if remote, United Nations ideals will be brought to bear upon 
human beings . . . . Through the Tribunal, those imperatives 
will be turned from abstract tenets into inescapable com­
mands.15 
At the opening session of the Yugoslav Tribunal in November 
1993, U.N. Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs Carl-August 
Fleischhauer said that in establishing the Tribunal, the Security 
Council had exhibited a determination to achieve three goals: "First, 
to put an end to the crimes being committed in ... the former 
Yugoslavia; second, to take effective measures to bring to justice the 
persons who are responsible for those crimes; and, third, to break the 
seemingly endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution."16 It is 
no overstatement to suggest that the success or failure of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal in meeting these goals of deterrence, justice and 
peace will decide the direction of human rights enforcement in the 
next century. 
A. The Deterrent Value of the Trial 
The trial of Dusko Tadic should be seen as an effort, not merely to 
bring an individual to justice but to understand the most barbarous 
butchery to blight Europe in fifty years. One of the tribunal's goals 
was to prevent a repetition of recent history. The record of the Tadic 
trial provides the authoritative and impartial account to which 
future historians may turn for truth, and future polit icians for 
warning. While there are various means to achieve an historic 
14 See id. 
15 Report ofthe International Tribunal for the Prosecution ofPersons Responsible for Serious 
Violations ofinternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory ofthe Former Yugo­
slavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152, at 49, U.N. Doc. Al49/342 (1 994). 
16 Guido de Bruin, Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal Inaugurated in The Hague, INTER 
PREss SERVICE, Nov. 17, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2532943. 
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record of abuses after a war, the most authoritative rendering is 
possible only through the crucible of a trial that accords full due 
process. 17 
If, to paraphrase George Santayana, we are condemned to repeat 
our mistakes unless we learn the lessons of the past, then we must 
establish a reliable record of those mistakes. 18 The Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court Justice Robert J ackson, 
underscored the logic of this proposition when he reported to 
President Truman that one of the most important legacies of the 
Nuremberg trials following World War II was that they documented 
the Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in such detail that 
there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and 
no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among 
informed people. »19 Similarly, the Tadic trial has generated a 
comprehensive record of the nature and extent of violations in the 
Balkans, the method by which they were planned and executed, the 
fate of individual victims, the individuals who gave the orders and 
those who carried them out. By carefully proving these facts one 
witness at a time in the face of vigilant cross-examination by 
distinguished defense counsel, the Tadic trial produced a definitive 
account that can endure the test of time and resist the forces of 
revisionism. 
The story that emerged from the Tadic trial was of a country 
whose people got swept up in the hurricane of ethnic nationalism. 
Witness after witness testified that there had been general ethnic 
harmony and a high rate of interfaith marriage in Bosnia before 
1992.20 The trial proved that the hatred that emerged in 1992 had 
17 One means of establishing an historic record of atrocities which is in vogue these days is 
through the creation of a "Truth Commission." See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth 
Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS Q. 597 (1994) (engaging in 
a comprehensive survey of truth commissioIl8 in fifteen countries). Yet, Truth Commissions 
are a poor substitute for prosecutions. They do not have prosecutorial powers such as the 
power to subpoen' witnesses or punish perjury, and they are viewed as one-sided since they 
do not provide those accused of abuses with the panoply of rights available to a cr iminal 
defendant. 
18 See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHAsES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 396 
(1953) (concluding that "there can be no serious history until there are archives and preserved 
records"). 
19 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief 
of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals (June 7, 1945), 
reprinted in 39 AM. J . INT'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945). 
20 See Michael P. Scharf, Luring Out Humanity's Dark Side: U.N. War Crimes Trial of 
Bosnian Serb Suggests that Manipulation, Not History, Can Turn Ordinary People into 'Willing 
Executioners', BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1996, at D2. 
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been engineered, not innate. Serb-controlled television and radio 
spread ethnic hatred like an epidemic.21 By way of comparison, one 
of the witnesses asked the judges to imagine what would happen if 
former KIu Klux Klan leader David Duke seized control of all the 
television and radio stations in America.22 
A half century after Nuremberg, historians like Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen continue to address the question of how so many ordinary 
people could be so readily enlisted to participate in atrocities. 
Goldhagen's recent work, Hitler's Willing Executioners, hypothesizes 
that the Holocaust was a product of the German people's unique 
cultural predisposition toward "eliminationist antisemitism ...23 But 
the Tadic case suggests a different answer. Lead prosecutor Grant 
Niemann believes the trial proves that ''human beings are universal­
ly capable of doing the things Tadic has done.,,24 The most extraor­
dinary hallmark ofthe Yugoslav carnage was its intimacy. Torturers 
knew their victims and had often grown up alongsid~ them as 
neighbors and friends. Perhaps the real lesson of the Tadic trial is 
that given the right set of circumstances, many of us can become 
willing executioners. It is what the American historian Hannah 
Arendt, in her classic account of the Eichmann trial, referred to as 
the ''banality of evil.,,25 Three centuries earlier, the philosopher 
21 See id. at D2. See also, e.g., Michael Dobbs, Yugoslavia Maps a Road to Ruin; Ecorwmic 
Collapse, Nationalist Conflict, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1993, at Al (discussing the artificial 
creation of hatred through television); Richard C. Dujardin, How the Media Perpetuates 
Stereotypes, PROVIDENCE J.-BVLL., Apr. 27, 1996, at C7 (discussing the power of the media to 
create hatred and antagonism); George Rodrigue, Bridges Burned: Bosnian Capital's Ethnic 
Groups Resigned to Life in Divided City, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 1993, at Al 
(reporting on the results of television and radio propaganda); Serbs Flee Muslim-Led 
Government, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 29, 1996, at A7 (noting the use of hate-filled media 
broadcasts as a method of war). 
22 See Scharf, supra note 20, at D2. 
23 DANIEL JONAH GoLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND 
THE HOLOCAUST 375-454 (1996) (focusing on whether German citizens voluntarily participated 
i_'l <,:.:tions against Jews). 
24 Interview with Grant Niemann, Prosecutor, International War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996) (notes of interview on file with 
author). 
2l> HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). 
Arendt concluded that Adolf Eichmann, who stood trial in Jerusalem in the summer of 1992 
as "the engineer of, Hitler's Final Solution," was neither a monster nor a "perverted sadist" as 
the prosecution had described him. [d. at 276. Rather, Arendt believed that "the trouble with 
Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither 
perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal." [d . 
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Thomas Hobbes hypothesized that there exists a thin line between 
civilization and barbarism.26 
What are the circumstances that can lure out this dark side of 
human nature and push us across that thin line? "That is one of the 
mysteries of the Yugoslav conflict," says Deputy Prosecutor Graham 
Blewitt. 27 "What transforms ordinary people into savages? The 
Tadic case gave us a glimpse of how provocation, incitement, and 
propaganda can raise hatred and fear to such an extent that 
ordinary people turn on their neighbors in a bloodthirsty way," 
Blewitt added. 28 Throw in an official sanction, a bit of coercion by 
persons in authority, pressure from assenting comrades, oppor­
tunities for personal gain, and a long history of ethnic tension, and 
you have the active ingredients of ethnic cleansing-Bosnian style. 
What is most shocking about the Balkan conflict is not that 
atrocities were committed, but that the rest of the world once again 
did so little to prevent them or bring them to an end. As Court TV 
anchor Terry Moran observed during the trial, 
[t]he Tadic trial proved how very difficult it is for people to 
care about evil in countries and places that are far from their 
personal experiences. Whether we are humankind in fact as 
well as in name is an open question in light ofwhat happened 
in Bosnia and the international community's continuing 
inadequate response. 29 
Unfortunately, world-wide ethnic nationalism likely has not reached 
its final zenith willh events in the former Yugoslavia. As Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently wrote, "Of the next fifty states 
which will come into being in the next fifty years, ethnic conflict will 
be almost [always] the defining characteristic by which that process 
will take place.,,3o Consequently, the questions raised by the 
26 See THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 94-98 (Everyman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1929) (1651) 
(discussing the natural inclination of even the civilized toward violence). 
'rl Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor in the Tadic Trial, in The Hague, 
Netherlands (July 26, 1996) (notes of interview on file with author). 
28 ld. 
29 War Crimes on Trial (Court TV television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1996). For a discussion 
"about the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the ... trial [of Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadicl and the prospects for a permanent international 
criminal court," see Terry Moran (Court TV Broadcast of the Tadic Trial, Sept. 17, 
1996)(visited Jan. 31, 1997) <http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reportsiinterv 
iew.html>. 
so Aleksa Djilas, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia, NEW REPUBUC, Jan. 25, 1993, 
at 38, 42 (book review of DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN INTER­
NATIONAL POLITICS (1993)). 
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savagery in the Balkans-how to preserve minority rights, when to 
recognize claims to self-determination, how to apply preventive 
strategies, and when and how to use force-are likely to confront us 
again and again in the coming years.31 More than anything else, 
the record of the hostilities in the Balkans generated by the Tadic 
trial should stand as a reminder to the international community of 
the perils of unchecked ethnic conflict. 
If the fate of the victims of Bosnia stands as a lesson to the 
international community, the image of Dusko Tadic in the dock, 
transmitted throughout the world by satellite, sends a message to 
would-be war criminals and human rights abusers around the globe 
that in the future those who commit such acts may be held account­
able for their actions. As Judge McDonald, who presided over the 
Tadic trial, succinctly put it: "We are here to tell people that the rule 
of law has to be respected."32 
The vehicle of a televised trial is an especially potent one for 
attaining respect for the rule of law and deterring future violations. 
Throughout the summer of 1996, live television coverage of the Tadic 
trial was carried throughout Bosnia, "while private cable TV 
transmission in Belgrade .. . made the trial accessible to at least a 
limited Serbian audience.,,33 As Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone 
stated in an interview, "People don't relate to statistics, to 
generalizations. People can only relate and feel when they hear 
somebody that they can identify with telling what happened to 
them.,,34 That's why the public broadcasts of the Tadic case can 
have a strong deterrent effect. , 
"While Nuremberg came too late to help the Nazis' victims, the 
Tadic trial and [the subsequent trials before the Yugoslav Tribunal] 
at least have a chance of deterring Serbs and others from continuing 
to commit war crimes."35 There is a particular benefit in laying 
bare to the unscathed Serbs in Belgrade the ghastly consequences of 
blood-curdling nationalistic rhetoric. Even for those who support 
31 See WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS 
DESTROYERS-AMERICA'S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY at xii (1996). 
32 Horne, supra note 13, at 65 . 
3S Tyler Marshall, U.N. Tribunal's Power on Trial; Balkans: First War Crimes Suspects Face 
Judgment. But Many See Fate ofRebel Serb Leaders as Real Test ofCourt's Effectiveness, L.A. 
TIMES, June 24, 1996, at A6. 
S4 Interview by Terry Moran with Justice Richard Goldstone, former prosecutor in the Tadic 
Trial (Court TV Broadcast of the Tadic Trial, Sept. 17, 1996) (visited Jan. 19, 1997) 
<http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reportS/interview.html>. 
S5 Horne, supra note 13, at 6. 
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Karadzic and Milosevic, "it will be much more difficult to dismiss live 
testimony given under oath than simple newspaper reports," Deputy
36Prosecutor Graham Blewitt points out. "The testimony will send 
a reminder in a very dramatic way that these crimes were horren­
dous."37 
While there is ongoing debate about the general deterrent value of 
criminal punishment,38 prosecutor Grant Niemann believes "deter­
rence has a better chance ofworking with these kinds of crimes than 
it does with ordinary domestic crimes because the people who 
commit these acts are not hardened criminals; they're politicians or 
leaders of the community that have up until now been law-abiding 
people.,,39 Richard Goldstone adds: 
If people in leadership positions know there's an international 
court out there, that there's an international prosecutor, and 
that the international community is going to act as an 
international police force, I just cannot believe that they 
aren't going to think twice as to the consequences. Until now, 
they haven't had to. There's been no enforcement mechanism 
at all. 40 
Indeed, Richard Goldstone believes that the existence of the 
Tribunal may have already deterred human rights violations in the 
former Yugoslavia during the Croatian army offensive against Serb 
rebels in August 1995Y "[F]ear of prosecution in The Hague," 
Goldstone com..'llented, prompted "Croat authorities to issue orders 
to their soldiers to protect Serb civilian rights when Croatia took 
control of the Krajina and Western Slavonia regions of the 
country.,,42 Unfortunately, the existence of the Tribunal did not 
have a similar deterrent effect when Serbs massacred over 10,000 
civilians in the "safe area" of Srebrenica the previous month.43 
36 Interview with Graham Blewitt, supra note 27. 
37 Id. 
38 See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 45-48 (1974) (contending that 
those who commit crimes under emotional stress (such as murder in the heat of passion) or 
who have become expert criminals (such as professional safecrackers and pickpockets) are less 
likely than others to be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment). 
39 Interview with Grant Niemann, supra note 24. 
40 Interview by Terry Moran with .Justice Richard Goldstone, supra note 34. 
41 See War Crimes Prosecutor Says Tribunal May Have Deterred Violations, DEUTSCHE 
PREssE-AGENTUR, Jan. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
42 Id. 
43 See Answering For War Crimes; Lessons From the Balkans, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, 
at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Conflict in the Balkans: In Bosnia; Serbs 
Continuing To Shell 3 "Safe Areas, n N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at A5. 
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Perhaps this was because, at the time, the Bosnian-Serb leaders who 
were responsible for the Srebrenica atrocities (Radovan Karadzic and 
General Ratko Mladic) had no reason to believe that there was a real 
possibility that they would be brought to trial before the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal's deterrent value may ultimately be linked to the 
eventual fate of Karadzic and Mladic. "The international community, 
acting through the Security Council, has raised [the victims'] 
expectations that war criminals would be brought to account for the 
terrible atrocities which they have suffered," Goldstone has said.44 
"If the accused are left free to continue to flout international 
agreements and international law, is there really less likelihood of 
further violence in the former Yugoslavia ... ?,,45 Goldstone adds, 
"[t]he failure to make arrests also risks destroying the broader 
deterrent value of the tribunal. Future tyrants will be given notice 
that they also have nothing to fear from international justice for as 
long as they are surrounded by armed guards.,,46 
B. The Fairness of the Proceedings 
In a sense, four trials were simultaneously held in that compact, 
high-tech courtroom at The Hague from May to November 1996. 
First, and most obviously, there was the trial of Dusko Tadic, whose 
fate was in the hands of the Tribunal. Second, there was the trial 
of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the authorities in Belgrade, who 
were implicitly in the dock with Tadic. In fact, during the first two 
months of the trial, there was nearly as much evidence introduced 
into the record about Slobodan Milosevic's responsibility for ethnic 
cleansing as there was about the particular crimes Tadic had 
committed.47 Third, the international community was on trial for 
failing to prevent or halt the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia. 
The trial made clear that the fate of Bosnia could have been avoided, 
if only the major powers had possessed the political will and 
judgment to take vigorous actions when the time was right. Fourth, 
and perhaps most importantly, the Tribunal itself was on trial. In 
assessing the Tadic trial, one must ask whether the Tribunal 
discharged its duty in a way that creates confidence and faith that 
'4 Richard Goldstone, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Responsibility to Act, INTER PREss SERVICE, 





47 See Nicolas Miletitch, "Witness Q" Takes the Stand Against Tadk in Warcrimes Trial , 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 11, 1996, available in LEXlS, News Library, Curnws File. 
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guilt and innocence can be fairly adjudicated by an international war 
crimes tribunal. 
"Whatever amounts from this Tribunal," Deputy Prosecutor 
Graham Blewitt told the author, 
there will always be debates about whether it has been 
successful or not. It's difficult to quantify success. It's not 
just a matter of looking at the number of indictments, the 
number of persons tried, and the number of convictions. To 
me, the best measure of success is if [the Tribunal] can 
achieve the prosecution of individuals fairly, regardless of 
whether they are convicted or acquitted. 48 
The International Tribunal, with its detailed rules of procedure, 
represents an advance on its Nuremberg predecessor, notably by 
foreswearing trials in absentia,49 by making better provisions for 
the defense, and by providing a right of appeal.50 Still, at times, 
the Tribunal tread dangerously close to denying Tadic a fair trial, 
most conspicuously by its decision to allow certain prosecution 
witnesses to testify anonymously51 and to permit the prosecution to 
base so much of its case on hearsay. "For those who would respond 
to criticisms ofthe Tribunal by saying you have to start somewhere," 
Tadic's lawyer Michail Wladimiroff told the author in an interview 
at The Hague, "I say that's not good enough when you're dealing 
with a person whose life and liberty are at stake.,,52 Even the 
Tribunal's Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, confided that he is 
"personally very uncomfortable with the notion of going forward with 
witnesses whose identities are not disclosed to the accused.,,53 
In contrast to most televised trials, the Tadic proceedings were 
marked by a great deal of substance and very little sensationalism. 
The rhetoric was restrained, objections were few, and the cross­
examination was forceful but seldom insulting. Perhaps this is one 
of the inherent benefits of a non-jury trial. Then again, the effort to 
ensure an absolutely fair trial may have cut against the goal of 
48 Interview with Graham Blewitt, supra note 27. 

49 See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, arts. 20-21, 

reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 7, at 35-36. 
60 See id. at arts. 25-26, at 36. 
6 1 See Monroe Leigh, Yugoslavia Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 40 
AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996); Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, IT-94-I-T, Aug. 10, 1995, at 15. 
62 Interview with Michail Wladimiroff, part-time Professor of Economic Criminal Law at the 
University of Utrecht and senior partner in Wladimiroff & Spong, in The Hague, Netherlands 
(July 26, 1996) (notes of interview on me with author). 
53 Interview with Graham Blewitt, supra note 27. 
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deterrence. The world media (and viewers) soon lost interest in the 
orderly, yet unenthralling, proceedings. Reflecting this development, 
over the course of the trial, Court TV coverage waned from six hours 
of daily gavel-to-gavel coverage during the first days of the 
proceedings to brief nightly highlights after the first month. During 
this period, the number of print journalists covering the trial 
dwindled from over a hundred to less than a handful. 
While Prosecutor Goldstone repeatedly extolled the educational 
benefits of the world-wide coverage of the trial and its potential 
deterrent value, Grant Niemann told the author that "the popular 
appeal and educational aspect of the trial was not part of our 
consideration at all. Our prosecution strategy, including the order 
of our witnesses, was designed to secure a conviction, not boost the 
ratings of Court TV."54 But, as Fred Graham, the Chief Anchor and 
Managing Editor of Court TV, pointed out, "the prosecutors should 
have realized that if they presented an airtight case at the cost of 
boring the world into tuning them out, they had failed to accomplish 
an important part of their mission."55 
Yet, the prosecution had no real choice since the Tadic case 
presented such an extraordinary conflict in testimony, and the 
prosecution had so little documentary evidence. Like many cases, 
this one would come down to the question of credibility: Who would 
the judges believe? What makes this case so unique, however, is 
that most of the testimony on both sides was inherently biased. The 
prosecution eyewitnesses were Muslims, who were victims of abuse 
at the hand.s ofSerbs during an armed conflict; the defense witnesses 
were all Serbs, many of whom might well be guilty of their own war 
crimes. 
At Nuremberg, Prosecutor Robert Jackson told the judges, "We will 
not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes. 
There is no count in the Indictment that cannot be proved by books 
and records.,,56 In the Tadic trial, however, that is exactly what the 
prosecution asked the judges to do. The prosecution's task became 
all the more difficult when its most important witness-witness 
"L"-later admitted that he had falsely testified about Tadic's 
- ----------,.._-­
54 InterVIew with Grant Niemann, supra note 24. 
M Interview with Fred Graham, Chief Anchor and Managing Editor of Court TV, in New 
York, N.Y. (Aug. 20, 1996) (notes of interview on file with author). 
56 Opening Statement of Robert Jackson at Nuremberg (1945) (visited Mar. 3, 
1997)<httpi/www.courttv.com:80/casefiles/nuremberg/jackson.htm!> . 
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involvement in crimes at a Serb-run concentration camp.57 The 
prosecution tried to overcome the credibility problem through sheer 
numbers: over forty prosecution witnesses testified that they saw 
Dusko Tadic commit war crimes or placed him in locations where 
war crimes were committed.58 The prosecution strategy was to 
make the judges ask themselves: How could so many people be so 
wrong about Tadic's participation? 
C. The Role of the Trial in the Peace Process 
In addition to deterrence and justice, there is the issue of peace 
and reconciliation. The Yugoslav Tribunal was created, in the words 
of Security Council Resolution 827, to "contribute to the restoration 
and maintenance of peace.,,59 AB with Nuremberg, the sight of 
leading war crimes suspects-from all sides of the ethnic 
divide-standing trial and receiving sentences is supposed to enable 
the population scarred by the war to apportion blame on individuals 
and not on the collective. '''Avoiding collective guilt will greatly 
strengthen the peace process in Bosnia,'" says the Tribunal's press 
spokesman, Christian Chartier.60 "'We have an obligation to carry 
forward the lessons of Nuremberg,' President Clinton declared last 
fall. 'Those accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide must be brought to justice. There must be peace for justice 
to prevail, but there must be justice when peace prevails.",61 In a 
similar vein, on the day the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, 
the President of the Tribunal, Judge Antonio Ca.ssese, along with 
Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone said: 
J ustice is an indispensable ingredient of the process of 
national r econciliation. . .. It is essential to the restoration 
67 See Witness Says Bosnia Forced Him to Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1996, at 7 (reporting that 
prosecutors withdrew testimony of Dragan Opacic (witness "L") because he had been ordered 
by the Bosnian Government to lie to the Tribunal); War Crimes Tribunal Struggles on Amid 
Perjury Row, ANP ENGLISH NEWS BULL., Oct. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Curnws File (noting that the witness "L" incident ''highlights the problems of witness 
reliability raised ... throughout Tadic's trial"). 
68 See Gillian Sharpe, Prosecution Over In War Crimes Trial, UNITED PREss INT'L, Aug. 15, 
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Lawyer Wants Some Charges Dropped 
Against Serb, ANP ENGLISH NEWS BULL., Aug. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Curnws File. 
69 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 6, at l. 
60 Mark Rice-Oxley, Tribunal Depends on the Kindness ofFoes, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1996, at 
A10. 
6l Philip Shenon, G.!.'s in Bosnia Shun Hunt for War-Crime Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
1996, at 3. 
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of peaceful and normal relations between people who have 
had to live under a reign of terror. It breaks the cycle of 
violence, hatred and extra-judicial retribution. [Thus p]eace 
and justice go hand-in-hand.62 
If it achieves its aims, the Tribunal will do far more to secure 
lasting peace in Bosnia than the 60,000 NATO troops stationed there 
as part of the Dayton Accords. "If the trials fail, Justice Goldstone 
says, so will any attempt at peace."63 Goldstone adds: 
It is nonsensical to expect that hundreds of thousands of 
victims could forgive or forget . And if there is a peace treaty 
in former Yugoslavia or anywhere else in which the architects 
of atrocities are left unpunished in leading positions, then all 
it will be is an interval between cycles of violence.64 
For this reason, Goldstone insists, "the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, 
the indicted Bosnian Serb leader, ... [is] 'not only in the interests of 
justice but in the interests of peace.'''65 
To some extent, the Dayton Accords transformed the role of the 
Tribunal. After Dayton, its function was not just to punish the 
guilty but, through the issuance of indictments, to identify persons 
who, under the Agreement, were prohibited from being elected or 
appointed members of government in Bosnia.66 In this way, official 
accusation became a means of removing from the political scene men 
like Karadzic, who was viewed as the greatest impediment to peace. 
During the Tadic trial, Bosnia conducted its first post-war elections 
on September 17, 1996.67 Incredibly, the election took place with 
no bloodshed and little fraud, and the results provided a glimmer of 
hope that Bosnia would survive as a unified nation.68 "Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovic won the most votes for the three-person 
presidency" and thus the right to serve as chairman and head of 
62 Wilbur G. Landrey, Don't Forget War Crimes, Prosecutors Remind Us , ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (Fla .), Nov. 26, 1995, at 2A. 
63 Ed Vulliamy, In Times of Trial, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 31, 1995, a t T6. 
64 Id. 
65 Jane Perlez, War Crimes Prosecutor Vents Frustrations, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, a t AB. 
66 See Warrants Issued for Karadzic, Mladic; Other Developments , FACTS ON FILE WORLD 
NEWS DIG., July 11, 1996, at 474, C3. 
67 See Bosnia on the Road Back to Nationhood, The New Institutions Can Be Made to Work, 
With Outside Help, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Or.), Sept. 17, 1996, at 6A. 
68 See European Organization Certifws Bosnian Elections, The Validation Confirms that the 
Presidency Will Be Led By a Muslim, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 30, 1996, at 3 
(explaining that while the elections were not up to the standards of western democracies, they 
were adequate considering the recent war). 
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state pursuant to the Dayton Accord.69 A week later, in his address 
before the United Nations General Assembly, Izetbegovic 
underscored the continuing i~portance of the work of the War 
Crimes Tribunal to the peace process, stating, "[fJor the road to 
reconciliation to be opened, the criminals must be punished."70 The 
next day, the Security Council voted to lift the economic sanctions it 
had imposed on Serbia in accordance with the Dayton Accord.71 A 
day later, Izetbegovic and Serbian President Slobadan Milosevic met 
in Paris and agreed to establish full diplomatic relations and to work 
toward restoring trade and economic ties between Bosnia and 
Serbia.72 
III. THE CHOICE TO BEGIN WITH TADIC 
Dusko Tadic stood trial for the murder of thirteen people and the 
torture of at least eighteen others.73 In the United States, he would 
have been considered among the nation's worst mass murderers, 
rivaling the likes of Charles Manson, Albert DeSalvo ("the Boston 
Strangler"), Kenneth Bianchi ("the Hillside Strangler"), David 
Berkowitz ("Son of Sam"), Ted Bundy, and Jeffrey Dahmer.74 Yet, 
in the context of the former Yugoslavia, he is persistently referred to 
as a "small fry.,,75 
A number of critics have even questioned whether the Tribunal 
was correct to concentrate on such a "minor sadist" for its first case, 
"whereas Nuremberg put on trial the key Nazi leaders them­
selves.,,76 If, as one newspaper put it, "Mr. Tadic was no more than 
a monstrous tadpole in a pool of sharks,,,77 why should he have been 
69 Judith Ingram, Muslim Izetbegovic, Declared Winner in Bosnia, Brings New Hope for 
Unity, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1996, &t A2. 
70 Failure to Implement Dayton Could Bring More Conflict, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 
25, 1996, available in LEXlS, News Library, Curnws File. 
71 See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 3700th mtg. at 9, U .N. Doc. SIRES/1074 (1996) . 
72 See Lynne Terry, Bosnia, Serbia Sigh Diplomatic Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1996, at 
A2; Yugoslavia, Bosnia Sign Pact on Bilateral Ties; Sarajevo is Assured the Serbs Won't Secede, 
"SALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 1996, at 15A. 
73 See Alex Ross, Television View: Watching for a Judgment ofReal Evil, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 
12, 1995, at 37. 
74 See generally DONALD J. SEARS, To KILL AGAIN: THE MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
SERIAL MURDER (1991) (discussing the phenomenon of the serial killers in America, their 
behavioral profiles and their methods). 
75 Robert Block, First, Catch You a War Criminal, INDEP. (London), Apr. 30, 1995, at 4. 
76 Jon Swain, Serb War Criminals Flaunt Their Freedom, SUN. TIMEs (London), June 23, 
1996, at 1. 
77 John Lichfield, Sharks Escape as The Hague Tries a Minnow, INDEP. (London), May 12, 
1996, at 14. 
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the subject of the Tribunal's first prosecution? Hanne Sophie Greve, 
the Norwegian judge who served on the U.N.'s investigative 
commission for the former Yugoslavia, remarked that "[h]e is not the 
level of person I would like to see at the Hague. I think they should 
have aimed higher Up."78 
Yet, there are several reasons why Dusko Tadic turned out to be 
an ideal subject for the first trial. First, "Tadic fell into the hands of 
the international community when he was arrested in Germany in 
1994. "79 Given the nature of his alleged offenses and the massive 
body of evidence pointing to his guilt, the Tribunal could not just 
"turn a blind eye to the allegations.,,8o Second, through the Tadic 
case, the Tribunal has begun to construct a "pyramid of evidence" 
leading to the principals ultimately responsible for the horror in 
81Bosnia. Third, to the victims of Dusko Tadic and his colleagues, 
as well as to those who suffered as a result of the actions of ordinary 
prison guards and police officials, it is very important that some of 
their torturers be brought to justice.82 Only by prosecuting in­
dividuals at all levels of responsibility can the victims see that 
justice has been done. Finally, the Tadic case has provided an 
opportunity for the Tribunal to refine its procedure and the inter­
national legal rules before turning to the bigger fish and more 
difficult cases.83 
When asked whether the Tadic case was a good one to begin with, 
Richard Goldstone replied: 
If one had a choice, clearly not. Instead, one would have 
wanted to start with a higher profile defendant. It is highly 
unsatisfactory that someone at the level of Dusko Tadic 
should face trial and that those who incited and facilitated his 
conduct should escape justice and remain unaccountable. But 
it's really an academic question because we had no choice; 
Tadic was the only accused available to bring before the 
Tribunal at a time when the judges, the media, and the 
international community were clamoring for us to begin 
prosecutions.84 
78 Block, supra note 75, at 4. 
79 Lichfield, supra note 77, at 14. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Block, supra note 75, at 14. 
83 See Lichfield, supra note 77, at 14. 
84 Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, former prosecutor of the Tadic trial, in 
Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996) (notes of interview on file with author). 
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At the time of the Tadic t rial, there were just six other indicted 
Yugoslav war criminals in custody at The Hague: Croatian General 
Tihomir Blaskic, Bosnian Croat Zdravko Mucic, Serbian Army 
member Drazen Erdemovic, and Bosnian Muslims Zejnil Delalic, 
Hazim Delic, and Esad Landzo.85 According to Goldstone: 
Ifwe don't get more arrests for the Tribunal in the fairly near 
future, then I think people with justification will be able to 
conclude that we've been effectively prevented from doing the 
work that we've been set up to do. What worries me about 
the failure to effect arrests, is that the public perception of 
the success of the Tribunal is inextricably linked to the 
resources we are given. The politicians won't want to spend 
scarce dollars on what the public regards as a failure. 
mtimately, credibility is going to depend on whether we are 
able to put on trial in the Hague the major people who have 
been indicted.86 
The challenge for the Tribunal is to work backwards from the likes 
of Tadic to those who fanned the flames of hatred. Goldstone did not 
hesitate to indict Karadzic and Mladic, despite criticism at the time 
that such indictments would derail the peace process.87 But will 
the prosecutor have the fortitude to indict Slobodan Milosevic if the 
mounting evidence establishes his culpability? From a political point 
of view, such action in the near future would seem to be folly. But 
from the point of view of justice, it might be indispensable. Despite 
Goldstone's insistence that the indictment process is immune from 
politics, there is reason to believe that global diplomacy, for better or 
for worse, affects the Tribunal's policies.88 
Even bringing Karadzic and Mladic to justice has turned into an 
uphill battle for the Tribunal. 89 In its resolution conditionally 
lifting the trade sanctions on Serbia and Republika Srpska, the 
Security Council reiterated that compliance with the orders of the 
Tribunal was integral to the obligations of Serbia and Republika 
85 See UN Tribunal Sets January Date for War Crimes Trial, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Dec. 
18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library. The number in custody was at one time eight, 
but Bosnian Serb general Djordje Djukic had been released for medical reasons prior to his 
death and Bosnian Serb Goran Lajic was released when it was determined by the Prosecution 
that he was the wrong Goran Lajic. See Susanne Fowler, Tribunal Releases Suspect: Wrong 
Man, Cm. TRIB., June 18, 1996, at 10. 
86 Interview by Terry Moran with J ustice Richard Goldstone, supra note 34. 
87 See Lichfield, supra note 77, at 14. 
88 See Colin Soloway & Stephen J. Hedges, How Not to Catch a War Criminal, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REp., Dec. 9, 1996, at 63. 
89 See id. (discussing NATO policies toward the apprehension of Karadzic and Mladic). 
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Srpska under the Dayton agreement.90 According to the resolution, 
if either the Commander of the Implementation Force (lFOR), 
Admiral Leighton Smith of the United States, or United Nations 
High Representative Carl Bildt of Sweden, reported that those 
governments significantly failed to carry out their obligations, then 
the sanctions were to be automatically reimposed within five days,91 
Yet, as another indication of the relationship between international 
politics and the functioning of the Tribunal, no action was taken 
when General Ratko Mladic flaunted his freedom in the presence of 
television cameras on a ski slope and then appeared in public in 
Belgrade at the funeral of indicted war criminal, Djordje Djukic.92 
In May, Tribunal President Antonio Cassese called for the re­
imposition of sanctions against Serbia for failing to execute arrest 
93warrants. That request was elevated to a demand in June 
following the Rule 61 Hearing on Karadzic and Mladic.94 The 
Security Council responded with a statement that it "deplores the 
failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia and 
Montenegro] to execute the arrest warrants," but it neither 
threatened nor took any further action.95 
Goldstone places much of the blame on the NATO-led IFOR for 
Karadzic and Mladic's evasion of justice:96 "There is no moral, legal 
or political justification for a military authority to grant effective 
immunity to persons whom the prosecutor, on behalf of the Security 
Council, has determined should be brought to trial[,]" he says.97 
Goldstone continued: 
That IFOR, with its force of 60,000 troops, its sophisticated 
weaponry and intelligence capability, is able to effect such 
arrests must be beyond question. From a political point of 
90 See s.c. Res. 1022, U.N. SCOR, 3595th mtg. at I , U.N. Doc. SIRES/I022 (1995). 
91 See id. at 2. 
92 See Richard Goldstone, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Responsibility to Act, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, June 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10767855. 
93 See Security Council Expresses Profound Concern at Failure of Federal RepublIC of 
Yugoslavia to Cooperate with Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3663d mtg. at I, 
U.N. Doc. Press Release SC/6219 (1996) (appending letter from Antonio Cassese to the 
President of the Security Council dated April 24, 1996). 
94 See War Crimes Tribunal Presses for Arrest of Top Bosnian Serbs; Head Judge Urges 
Capture as Message to All Dictators, BALT. SUN, July 13, 1996, at A7. 
95 Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, at I, U.N. Doc 
SIPRST/1996/23 (1996) . 
96 See Goldstone, supra note 92; see also Robert Fisk, Bosnia Judge Condemns West, INDEr'. 
(London), Sept. 17, 1996, at Tl (discussing Goldstone's disgust over the failure to prosecute the 
war criminals). 
97 Goldstone, supra note 92. 
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view, can IFOR's men in uniform legitimately argue that they 
can avoid certain duties because they are potentially 
dangerous? On a national level, policemen are not infre­
quently obliged to arrest people who are armed and 
dangerous. Yet it is inconceivable that an attorney general 
would call off the arrests because of the risks to the lives of 
the arresting officers.98 
Others felt that dispatching NATO troops to hunt down Serbs 
would be a tragic mistake.99 They feared it would fuel the conflict 
by handing the two sides more scores to settle when NATO was 
scheduled to depart at the end of the year. 1OO General Mladic, 
himself, told an interviewer that "NATO-led military forces would 
pay heavily if they tried to arrest him. 'They have to understand one 
thing, that I am very expensive and that my people support me."'1Ol 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has similarly warned that 
Bosnia "'could blow up'" if top Bosnian Serb indicted war criminals 
were arrested. 102 
According to Richard Goldstone, the trials before the Tribunal are 
likely to continue for at least the next three to four years. 103 
Whether the likes of Karadzic and Mladic will ever face justice before 
the Tribunal remains to be seen. Even if they do, however, 
Goldstone will not have the satisfaction of overseeing their 
prosecution. At the end of the Tadic trial, the Tribunal's venerated 
prosecutor resigned from his post to resume his position on South 
Africa's Constitutional Court. 104 He was succeeded by Justice 
Louise Arbour, a rising star in the Canadian court system who has 
presided over some of her country's most politically charged civil 
rights and war crimes cases.105 Like Goldstone, Arbour has had no 
98 Id. 
99 See, e.g., William Drozdiak, U.S. Urges Formation of Special Police Unit for War Crime 
Duty; Allies Cool to Auxiliary Force for Bosnia, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1996, at A25 (explaining 
the U.S. position on the formation of a specially trained police force for the task of 
apprehending war criminals). 
100 See id. See also generally Jon Swain, Mladic at Bay as Bosnian Serb Leaders Court 
World Approval, SUN. TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 1996 (discussing the attempt by civilian 
leaders to overthrow Mladic) . 
101 Shrugging Off Indictment, Bosnian Serb General Skis, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1996 (Late 
ed.), at A3. 
102 Jane Perlez, Failure to Arrest Bosnian Serbs Threatens Peace, UN Prosecutor Says, 
OTTAWA CIT12EN, May 22, 1996, at A13. 
103 Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, supra note 84. 
104 See id. 
105 See Barbara Crossette, 2 Tribunals on Atrocities Will Be Led by Canadian, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1996 (Late ed.), at A7. 
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previous prosecutorial experience. 106 However, Goldstone's 
strengths were his vision and his diplomatic acumen, rather than his 
administrative or trial skills.l07 Only time will tell whether Justice 
Louise Arbour will be able to ensure that the Tribunal maintains 
momentum at a critical period in its history. 
IV CONCLUSION AND PRELUDE TO THE FUTURE 
The Yugoslavia Tribunal was meant as a one-time-only ad hoc 
institution. But soon after the Tribunal had been established, the 
Security Council found itself faced with an even greater genocide, 
when over half a million Tutsis were massacred by the Hutus in 
Rwanda during a one hundred day period in the spring of 1994.108 
Comparing the scale of the crimes committed in Rwanda to Nazi 
Germany and Bosnia, Rwanda's Prime Minister-designate asked the 
United Nations Security Council, "'Is it because we're Africans that 
a [similar] court has not been set Up?",109 With the justifiable 
charge of Eurocentrism ringing through the United Nations, the 
Security Council was compelled to establish a Rwanda Tribunal, 
which has its own Trial Chambers but shares the Appeals Chamber 
and the Office of the Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. 110 
The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal showed that the machinery 
designed for the Yugoslavia Tribunal could be employed for other 
specific circumstances and offenses, thereby avoiding the need to 
reinvent the wheel in response to each global humanitarian crisis. 
Yet, the Security Council shows no signs of setting up a tribunal for 
the crimes committed by Iraq against the Kuwaitis during the Gulf 
War, the genocide in Cambodia, the terrorism committed by Libya, 
or the crimes against humanity recently committed in EI Salvador, 
Haiti, and East Timor. There are several reasons why the Security 
Council has proven unwilling or unable to continue with the ad hoc 
106 See Frank Wright, Troubled Path to Peace-Mass Graves Hold the Clues, Forensics Expert 
Says-Former Medical Examiner is Preparing to Return to the Former Yugoslavia this Spring 
to Try to Make Sure that International Inquiries into Mass Murders There Are Successful, STAR­
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 19, 1996, at A6; Arresting War Criminals Not NATO's 
Job, Judge Says, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Mar. 5, 1996, at 4. 
107 See Clare Dyer, Judge of Our Inactions, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 1, 1994, at 29 
(discussing Judge Goldstone's life experiences and how they have shaped his judicial decisions). 
108 See Stephen Buckley, Tribal Labels Mask African Power Struggle; In Rwanda and 
Burundi, Ethnic Politics Is Letting More Blood, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1996, at AI. 
109 Nelson Graves, Premier· Designate Compares Rwanda to Nazi Genocide, REUTERS WORLD 
SERVICE, May 26, 1994. 
110 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/955 (1994). 
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approach that was employed for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The first 
reason is sometimes referred to as "tribunal fatigue" because the 
process of reaching a consensus on the Tribunal's statute, electing 
judges, selecting a prosecutor, and appropriating funds has turned 
out to be extremely time consuming and politically exhausting for the 
members of the Security Council. ll1 Second, at least one per­
manent member of the Security Council, China, has openly expressed 
concern about using the Yugoslavia Tribunal as precedent for the 
creation of other ad hoc criminal tribunals1l2-perhaps out of fear 
that its own human rights record might subject it to the proposed 
jurisdiction of such future international criminal courts. Third, the 
creation of ad hoc tribunals by the Council is viewed as inherently 
unfair by the vast majority of countries that do not possess per­
manent membership or veto power on the Council, because the 
permanent members are able to shield themselves and their allies 
from the jurisdiction of such Tribunals, notwithstanding atrocities 
that may be committed within their borders.1I3 The final reason 
for hesitation in creating additional ad hoc tribunals is purely 
economic; that is, the expense of establishing Tribunals is simply 
seen as too much for an organization whose budget is already 
stretched extremely thin.1l4 
A permanent international criminal court established by treaty is 
hailed by the majority of countries in the United Nations as the 
solution to the problems that afflict the ad hoc approach. The U.N. 
General Assembly has set up a preparatory conference to hammer 
out a statute for a permanent international criminal court based on 
the draft completed in 1994 by the International Law Commis­
sion.1l5 This time, even the United States is giving its support to 
111 S ee David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT'L PEACE, Mar. 22, 1996, at 34. 
112 See Provisional Verbation Record of the Three Thousand, Two Hundred and Seventeenth 
Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 33-34, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (prov. ed. 1993) (containing 
the statement of Mr. Li Zhaoxing of China at the time of voting on Security Council Resolution 
827, which established the Yugoslavia Tribunal). China later abstained on Security Council 
Resolution 955, which established the Rwanda Tribunal. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d 
mtg. at 1, UN. Doc. SIRESl955 (1994). 
113 See Francisco Villagran De Leon, Editorial, Stop Abuses of U.N. Security Council Veto 
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997 (Late ed.), at 22 (noting the advantage that permanent 
members have over other countries); Malaysia Calls for UN Security Council Veto Power 
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